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THE ENGINEERS IN THE PRICE SYSTEM 
Alfred A. DeSimone, Jr.* 
AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE CAPITALISM. By David F. Noble. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 1977. Pp. xxvi, 384. $12.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly everyone would agree that advanced industrial so-
ciety would be unthinkable without its complex, scientifically 
based technology. In discussing the growth of modern technology, 
however, scholars as well as laymen have often committed the sin 
Marxian theorists call "reification"-that is, they have mistaken 
the creations of particular societies in particular times and places 
for sovereign forces that move by their own internal logic to deter-
mine human actions. To David F. Noble, the author of America 
by Design, the currency of this reified notion of science and tech-
nology seems paradoxical, for during the very time in which that 
notion has risen to importance, modern technology as a social 
process has come increasingly "under the conscious control of 
human authority, in the specific form of private corporate capi-
tal" (p. xxvi). In this important new study, Noble tries to break 
through the paradox, to reveal the human and social realities 
behind the "myth of the machine," by tracing the development 
of modern technology within its American matrix-corporate 
capitalist society. 
Noble's "primary thesis" is explicitly Marxian. In his view, 
American technology has evolved in symbiosis with corporate 
capitalism: technology has provided capitalism "the wherewithal 
for unlimited productive growth by implicating science in the 
production process," while the corporation has cleared the way 
for the use of technology by "offsetting the destructive tendencies 
inherent in an unchecked, competitive market economy by mak-
ing possible the regulation of production, distribution and 
prices." The tendency of this symbiosis, he believes, has been to 
preserve and even to strengthen the basic social relations of capi-
talism· by giving them an appearance of rationality and effi-
ciency; as a result what Marcuse calls a "technological veil" has 
* Graduate student, Department of History, University of Massachusetts. B.A. 1970, 
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been thrown over a system that remains unjust and exploitive (p. 
xxiii). 
In trying to establish this thesis-to rend, as it were, the 
technological veil-Noble has obviously set himself a large task. 
True to his conception of technology as a social product, he has 
chosen to approach his task through an extensive analysis of the 
class most responsible for giving American technology its charac-
teristic form-the engineering profession, and especially those 
engineers connected with the vanguard of "science-based" indus-
try, the chemical and electrical industries. Occupying key posi-
tions within the technologically most advanced sectors of the cor-
porate economy, these men, along with like-minded professors 
and executives, were in Noble's view the catalysts in the com-
pounding of technical and capitalist reason. They allegedly per-
formed this service in the period between 1900 and 1930 by de-
signing-in accordance with a "world-view of corporate re-
form"-new customs and institutions that would bring society as 
a whole into closer conformity with the needs of science-based 
industrial corporations {p. xxv). 
The thesis advanced in America by Design deserves careful 
consideration, for the issue of whether corporations have come to 
dominate modern technology and its practitioners has obvious 
significance in wider realms than the history of engineering per 
se. Noble's argument also bears directly on the status of modern 
professions in general, for, as we shall see, it challenges the no-
tion that professional autonomy is possible when large private 
corporations control access to the most remunerative forms of 
professional practice and have a strong influence over profes-
sional education. He implicitly attacks as well a commonly held 
notion about "post-industrial" society, namely, that as expert 
professionals make more and more of the decisions in both the 
public and private sphere, older questions of class conflict are 
becoming obsolete. The actual historical relationship between a 
key component of the so-called "new class" of professionals and 
private corporate capital clearly provides a test of the validity of 
this idea. Finally, Noble's portrait of engineering, according to 
the Foreword by Christopher Lasch, forms part of a comprehen-
sive critique of modern American capitalism that is being devel-
oped by recent left-wing scholarship. This critique centers on the 
so-called "second industrial revolution" that occurred roughly 
between 1880 and 1930, and Noble's contribution attempts to 
show how engineers participated during that era in forging the 
basic tools that would eventually make the world safe for oligop-
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oly (pp. xi-xiii). 
America by Design thus addresses several important ques-
tions. But the degree to which the book in its various parts illumi-
nates each one varies. Because of this, because much of the evi-
dence Noble draws upon is unfamiliar, even to American histori-
ans, and because the many strands from which he weaves his 
"primary thesis" are themselves of interest, it seemed best in this 
review to follow his argument step by step. Once the merits and 
faults of the parts fall into perspective, the meaning of the whole, 
it is hoped, will emerge more clearly. 
I 
The so-called "corporate reform" efforts of engineers after 
1900 form the centerpiece of Noble's discussion; the second and 
third of the three parts into which the book is divided chronicle 
those efforts. The first part of America by Design sketches the 
background; it tells the story of how technology, as represented 
by the professional engineer, became "wedded" to industry, as 
represented by the giant corporation. Here also, by cataloging the 
social problems corporate capitalism faced in the early twentieth 
century, Noble tries to recreate the atmosphere which gave corpo-
rate reform its sense of urgency. 
Noble's contentions in Part I are central to his argument as 
a whole, for they outline the actual state of affairs which the 
engineers' social "designs" supposedly both assumed and meant 
to perpetuate. That state of affairs can be described as follows: 
after emerging late in the nineteenth century, science-based in-
dustry-which Noble defines as "industrial enterprise in which 
ongoing scientific investigation and the systematic application of 
scientific knowledge to the process of commodity production have 
become routine parts of the operation" (p. 5)-experienced great 
expansion and concentration between 1880 and 1920. In the two 
leading science-based industries in particular, first in the electri-
cal and later in the chemical industry, the need to consolidate 
and exploit patent control over important inventions and pro-
cesses combined with more general forces encouraging industrial 
combination to usher in an age of giant corporations {p. 18). 
Because these firms were the first to institutionalize the applica-
tion of scientific method to manufacturing operations, they set 
the pattern for other highly technological enterprises, such as the 
petroleum, rubber, and auto industries. 
During the same period in which industry was increasingly 
coming under the control of large corporations, the profession of 
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engineering was taking its modern form. In the training of engi-
neers, formal education at the college level was becoming the 
norm, and "shop-floor" experience was fading into the past. 
Chemical and electrical engineering had initiated this change; in 
these fields, unlike mechanical engineering; a true "shop-
culture" -the historian Monte Calvert's term for a form of profes-
sionalism based on the primacy of on-the-job training in indus-
try-had never developed.1 Here the roles of basic science and 
laboratory training had been crucial from the start, and the locus 
of this sort of expertise was the universities and technical schools 
(pp. 26-27). As all of industry grew technologically more complex, 
formalized "scientific" training came to rule all types of engi-
neering and thus largely to define the professional engineer. 
While the image of the applied scientist was coming to repre-
sent half of the modern engineer's self-concept, the changes in 
industry mentioned above were insuring that the image of the 
corporate team-player would emerge as the other half. The domi-
nation of science-based industry by giant, vertically integrated 
corporations precluded, for the vast majority of engineers, older 
forms of professional practice such as business ownership and 
independent consulting. Instead, effective work within corporate 
hierarchies became the principal route to professional success, 
and the best-rewarded corporate work lay in management. Thus, 
when one of Noble's key figures, William Wickenden-himself a 
successful _engineer-manager and teacher-undertook a massive 
study of engineering education in the 1920s, he found that the 
career patterns of two-thirds of the engineering graduates since 
1884 had shown "a healthy pattern of progression through techni-
cal work toward the responsibilities of management." Wicken-
den's advice to ambitious engineers, was succinct, if unsurpris-
ing: To succeed financially and socially, they would eventually 
have to "leave the engineering of materials and enter the engi-
neering of men" (p. 41). 
In Noble's view, then, the marriage between the science-
based corporation and the professional engineer was on firm 
ground by 1920, for "the large corporations needed the technical 
knowledge which only the professionals could provide. On the 
other hand the professional engineers required human organiza-
tion and material resources in order to render their knowledge 
1. Calvert expounds this idea of a "shop culture" and discusses the conflict between 
it and the more modem "school culture" in his book, ThE MECHANICAL ENGINEERS IN 
AMERICA, 1830-1910 (1967). 
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functional, and the large corporations had secured a monopoly on 
these" (pp. 43-44). It is important to note, however, that Noble 
does not claim these intrusive realities prevented engineers from 
developing and at times using a more traditional kind of profes-
sional identity-i.e., the one based on the "monopoly of esoteric 
knowledge" common to doctors, lawyers, and scientists (p. 40); 
he claims only that the old-style "corporate" identity was bound 
to be less significant than the new in guaranteeing professional 
prestige and success. The new style of professionalism, he insight-
fully points out, also directly undermined the old in two ways. 
First, the need to advance as individuals within corporate hier-
archies inhibited any sense of collegial autonomy engineers might 
have had as a class of experts. Second, the importance of 
corporate priorities in the minds of actual or potential erigineer-
managers detracted from the sense of personal autonomy that the 
"independent expert" often feels (pp. 41-42). 
Having established to his satisfaction the state of science-
based industry and the engineering profession in the early twen-
tieth century, Noble devotes a brief chapter to the social and 
e.conomic problems corporate America faced at that time. The 
picture he presents derives from the familiar critique of American 
corporate capitalism developed by "New Left" historians like 
William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and James Wein-
stein.2 Thus Noble asserts that after a period of intense, often 
chaotic price· competition and expansion of output in the late 
nineteenth century, a wave of mergers and consolidations spread 
through American business around 1900. The-temporary stability 
and high profitability that monopoly and oligopoly brought could 
not be maintained through stasis, however. To survive, American 
capitalism needed new means of insuring continuous, · efficient 
utilization of expensive manufactlµ"ing facilities; expanded op-
portunities for the investment of monopoly profits; and ex-
panded, stable markets for an unprecedented volume of goods 
(pp. 54-55). In the social sphere, the emerging corporate order had 
to face threats to social stability and to the continued dominance 
of capital that might make these· economic goals unattainable. 
Among these threats Noble includes: the tremendous surge of 
immigration from southern and eastern Europe; the rise of a 
2. In particular, see G. KoLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963); J. WEINSTEIN, 
THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LmERAL STATE 1900-1918 (1968); W.A. WILLIAMS, THE CoN-
TOURS OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1961); and the work of the economists P. BARAN & P. SWEEZY, 
MONOPOLY CAPITAL (1966). 
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strong social-reform movement in Progressivism; and, especially, 
the mounting challenge from organized labor and from large, 
highly visible radical organizations like the Socialist Party and 
the Industrial Workers of the World (pp. 55-60). 
Given their position in the social order, Noble tells us, the 
reaction of engineers to such a social and economic situation was 
predictable, though important nonetheless. Except for a few mav-
erick engineer-reformers like the Taylorite Morris Cooke, most 
"progressive-minded" engineers understood-and probably ap-
proved of-the fact that "radical engineers . . . had to choose 
between being radical and being engineers" (p. 63). Thus, they 
hoped to bring to pass whatever visions they had of an "affluent, 
humane, tranquil, and powerful America" by pursuing the twin 
goals of technological progress and corporate growth-the poles 
around which their own careers revolved (p. 64). Because they 
believed corporate growth was a necessary condition for ( or even 
the raison d'etre for) social improvement, Noble's engineers were 
close to being "corporate liberals," a group whose importance 
remains a controversial issue in American historiography. But 
fortunately he does not have to confront this problem directly, 
since the "corporate reforms" his engineers promoted shared a 
technological flavor that allows them to be treated separately 
from the usual list of "corporate liberal" causes, such as labor-
management cooperation and limited government regulation of 
business.3 
Before analyzing the actual attempts of corporate engineers 
to "design" new social institutions, we need to assess how ade-
quately Noble has portrayed the preconditions summarized 
above. First of all, his discussion of professionalization in chemi-
cal and electrical engineering is quite strong and genuinely adds 
to the understanding of the engineering profession provided by 
previous historical works like Calvert's and like Edwin Layton's 
Revolt of the Engineers (1971). Still, even though it is meant only 
to prepare for the "designs" that follow, the first part of the book 
has serious faults. Thus, while the majority of the corporate engi-
neers to be treated later in the book came from the ranks of 
electrical engineers, the initial development of the electrical man-
3. For recent works which use the concept of "corporate liberalism," see those cited 
in note 2 supra, as well as .J. GILBERT, DESIGNING THE INDUSTRIAL STATE (1972); R. RAoosH 
& M. ROTHBARD, A NEW HISTORY OF LEVIATHAN (1972); and .J. ISRAEL, BUILDING THE ORGAN!• 
ZATION OF SOCIETY (1972). The concept has often been criticized, most extensively in K. 
McQuaid, A Response to Industrialism: Liberal Businessmen and the Evolving Spectrum 
of Capitalist Reform (1975) (unpublished dissertation, Northwestern University). 
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ufacturing industry itself-the economic base, as it were, on 
which their superstructure of projects was erected-receives in-
sufficient attention; only seven pages of direct discussion and 
analysis are included in Part I, to which fifteen more are added 
later. Furthermore, all of the fifteen and most of the original 
seven are devoted to a single set of problems-i.e., those sur-
rounding the control of patents and inventions. The hard data 
that could establish claims about the industry's economic con-
centration, its profitability, and the size and complexity of its 
manufacturing facilities relative to other sectors are omitted. The 
same problem is even more acute for the chemical industry. This 
failure is especially critical because both these industries are so 
wide-ranging that generalizations built on the handful of exam-
ples included-such as the cases of electric lightbulbs and ra-
dios-cannot be safely carried to all product and service lines. 4 
A lack of information about vital issues also mars Noble's 
sketch of the social and economic situation at the start of the 
century. Though the reader does not require a detailed retelling 
of the story of "monopoly capital," he does need to know how and 
why the science-based industries specifically came to feel the 
economic pressures that Noble asserts affected corporate capital-
ism as a whole. Noble's general summary merely assumes the 
basics of monopoly capital; it does nothing to prove their applica-
bility to the case at hand. Sfmilarly, Noble assures us that the 
science-based industries felt the unsettling effects of social pro-
test and reform movements. Yet aside from mentioning a strike 
or two, the electoral strength of Socialists in towns like Schenec-
tady-a center of General Electric operations-and, much later 
in the book, the opposition of workers to Frederick W. Taylor's 
version of scientific management, he omits any detailed account 
of the interactions that must have occurred between science-
based firms and the social movements of 1900 to 1930. Thus, in 
both the economic and social spheres his account would have 
benefitted from fewer familiar generalizations about capitalist 
America and more specifics about the social and economic history 
of the industries he knows best. 
This deficiency is especially puzzling when one looks at the 
restricted range of "corporate reforn;i" discussed in Parts II and 
4. This point is stressed, for example, by the economist Jules Backman in his studies 
of both industries in recent times. See ,J. BACKMAN, THE Ec0No1111cs OF THE ELECTRICAL 
MACHINERY INDUSTRY (1962); .J. BACKMAN, THE EcoNOIIIICS OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 
(1970). 
692 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:685 
ill of America by Design. The very general framework developed 
in Part I could open outward toward all sorts of "corporate lib-
eral" causes: the reshaping of America in line with corporate 
needs was to be an epic undertaking. But instead Noble chroni-
cles only an inner circle of ideas and institutions, all closely re-
lated to the process of production in science-based industry itself. 
This set of projects he summarizes under the following categories: 
"standardizing science and industry, reforming the patent sys-
tem, routinizing research, transforming education, and develop-
ing modern management" {p. 321). The specificity of these re-
forms seems to demand a specific explanatory context for them, 
a context provided for technical education and partially for pat-
ents and research, but not for the others. 
The lack of economic background material also weakens 
Noble's case because it leaves him with no effective reply to an 
alternative explanation of the shape of science-based industry, 
one that relies more on its technological essence and less on the 
general character of monopoly capital. Thus, Alfred D. Chandler, 
in his 1977 study of the evolution of business enterprise in Amer-
ica, The Visible Hand, concludes that the effort to gain monopoly 
profits and perpetuate the conditions for exacting them has not 
been sufficient to establish or to preserve concentration or verti-
cal integration in American industry. Instead, Chandler argues, 
vertical integration, huge individual firms, and a high degree of 
concentration only proved profitable in industries that met cer-
tain technological and economic preconditions-industries 
"where the processes of production were capital intensive and 
energy-consuming, and where the creation of a marketing organi-
zation assisted in the selling and distribution of mass-produced 
products. " 5 Since Chandler believes that the electrical-
equipment and chemical industries did meet these preconditions, 
his list of the priorities facing twentieth-century managers in 
these industries resembles Noble's-for example, both authors 
emphasize the ·need to design more efficient management meth-
ods and to organize large research establishments. But Chan-
dler's explanation of the processes underlying the priorities is 
more cogent, since it explains better why some industries and not 
others had to recognize those priorities. 
5. A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN 
BUSINESS 372 (1977). 
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II 
I might seem to have lavished inordinate analysis and criti-
cism on only about 60 of the 320 pages of America by Design. I 
have done so because most of the remaining 260 pages contain an 
intellectual and, especially, an· institutional history of elite 
groups-engineer-managers employed by leading industrial 
firms, professors in engineering schools, and key figures in quasi-
public agencies like the National Research Counci_l of the World 
War I era. Noble analyzes in great and sometimes exhaustive 
detail the programs and causes these elites supported and their 
rationales for sponsoring them. Yet because of the weakness in 
the foundation for these analyses, America by Design comes up 
long on "design" and rather short on "America." This diminishes 
its value as social history, especially from the-Marxian viewpoint 
adopted, for that viewpoint assumes the close interaction of so-
cial, economic, and institutional forces (a point stressed in Chris-_ 
topher Lasch's foreword to the book itself [p. xiii]). 
All this is not meant to deny the merit hi Noble's institu-
tional and intellectual history of "corporate reform." Each of the 
topics he deals with is significant, and the virtues and faults of 
his treatment of them deserve attention. The first project that 
he discusses-scientific and inclustrial standardization-seems 
relatively clear-cut. While variety in consumer goods might 
testify to the dynamism of free enterprise, a similar variety in the 
materials and machinery used in industry conflicted with what 
Noble sees as the requirements of the mass-production process 
-"uniformity, precision, reproducibility, and predictability" 
{p. 70). A need for fixed standards of quality and performance in 
consumer goods also became evident as mass marketing evolved. 
It was not surprising, therefore, that corporate engineers worked 
for greater precision in scientific standards as a basis for those of 
industry, or that when these efforts succeeded in creating a strong 
National Bureau of Standards, that agency would offer services 
of direct value to industry as well as to science {pp. 71-75). 
Though the problem of industrial standardization proved to be 
more complex than that of scientific standardization, Noble also 
shows that by the late 1920s important changes, often spons9red 
by the government, had come to the· electrical, chemical, and 
auto industries-e.g., product simplification, standard specifica-
tions for parts and raw materials, and more precise methods for 
rating the capabilities of materials and products (pp. 75-82). 
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While the standardization Noble sketches seems to have 
progressed rapidly and successfully, one doubts whether it 
achieved, or was intended to achieve, the purposes he ascribes to 
it. In his view the standardization movement aimed not only at 
reducing inefficiencies due to diversity, but also at controlling 
"competition in production," which engineers purportedly saw as 
a threat to corporate stability (p. 70). Yet his own illustrations 
show that standardization could work to increase competition as 
well as to reduce it. In the electrical industry, standardization did 
buttress the pre-eminence of General Electric, Westinghouse, and 
American Telephone & Telegraph in many fields and thus pro-
moted industrial concentration; but in the automotive industry, 
it was first sponsored by smaller manufacturers, in order to break 
the limited monopolies that individual parts suppliers which pro-
vided unique products often held over their customers {p. 79). 
While Noble may be right in implying that cases like the former 
outweighed those like the latter, he cites no quantitative evidence 
that the trend lay in this direction. 
According to Noble, the next link in the chain of corporate 
hegemony over technology was the attempt to control the process 
of invention, largely through the use of patents and organized 
research. Relying heavily for his data on the electrical-equipment 
industry-and again on General Electric, American Telephone & 
Telegraph, and Westinghouse in particular-he claims that by 
1929 the patent system had become a prop for corporate preroga-
tives instead of a spur to individual invention. This was allegedly 
produced by action in three areas. First, the large corporations 
adopted policies in handling patent matters that effectively 
forced individual inventors to the wall. Thus, corporations inten-
tionally used patent infringement suits to deplete a competitor's 
resources, made restrictive patent-pooling and licensing agree-
ments, and filed multiple auxiliary patents around a primary 
patent to extend its useful life {pp. 91-95, 97-98). Second, firms 
in science-based industry set up large in-house research organiza-
tions to develop new inventions systematically. Once these were 
established, corporate managers gradually exerted greater control 
over the work of their researchers. For example, they instituted 
closer accounting· of the time and effort spent by individual re-
searchers and subdivided research projects into specialized units; 
in addition they began to require employees to sign over all patent 
rights to potential inventions as a condition of employment, and 
even eliminated bonuses for individual inventions {pp. 119-21, 
101). Finally the corporations worked to "reform" the government 
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patent apparatus by introducing predictability and efficiency 
into its operations. These efforts first began to bear fruit during 
World War I, when the-wartime regulation of industry encouraged 
patent pools and other devices of value to large corporations; after 
the war new laws gave the Patent Office a more "professional" 
complexion and made the appeals process more centralized (pp. 
102-08). The result, according to Noble, was a new "formalism" 
in the patent system that put corporations at an even greater 
advantage over individual inventors, since the latter found it dif-
ficult to cope with the "intricacies and complexities" of the new 
procedures (pp. 108-09). 
Noble draws a rather drastic conclusion about the cumula-
tive effect of these changes: Because of them, and because the 
courts refused to counteract them by applying antitrust laws 
more vigorously to patent-related cases, by 1930 the patent pro-
cess had become so corporatized "as to render subsequent judicial 
and legislative efforts to check corporate monopoly through pat-
ent control too little, too late" (p. 88). He supports this statement 
with statistics that show a trend in the direction claimed-by 
1950, for example, fully seventy-five percent of new patents were 
assigned to corporations. Also, in the late 1930s, seventeen per-
cent of the patents went to large firms with over $50 million in 
assets, while such firms had received only three percent in 1916. 
Still, the apparent difference in the percentages for corporation-
held patents and patents of major corporations indicates some-
thing less than the full-blown "corporate monopoly through pat-
ent control" that Noble's examples-like patent pooling among 
such giants as General Electric and American Telephone & Tele-
graph-imply. 6 Furthermore, these relatively few examples are 
restricted to the pre-1930 period; thus, they fail to justify the 
claim that events since 1930 have been just more of the same, an 
acute and conspicuous failure, since other writers on the 
electrical-equipment industry have argued that the importance of 
patent-pooling and licensing agreements in maintaining market 
positions has declined markedly since World War II.7 
6. This is not to say, however, that these examples are trivial or false. Leonard S. 
Reich, in studying the early development of radio in detail, makes an argument similar 
to Noble's about corporate research and patent strategies in that field and concludes that 
"in almost every case, research became a more important factor in competition for monop-
oly control than in competition for shares of the market." Reich, Research, Patents and 
the Struggle To Control Radio: A Study of Big Business and the Uses of Industrial 
Research, 51 Bus. HlsT. REv. 209, 234 (1977). 
7. See, e.g., J. BACKMAN, supra note 4, at 110-11; 1 R. SULTAN, PRICING IN THE ELECTRI-
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The problem of overstatement raised by Noble's discussion 
of the patent system extends to his analysis of industrial research 
as a whole. He seems to be trying to establish two distinct propo-
sitions-first, that industrial research became a largely corporate 
endeavor and, second, that it became a tool of monopoly and 
oligopoly-as though they were equivalent. In reviewing the ex-
pansion of in-house research between 1900 and 1930, he definitely 
establishes the plausibility of the first; only relatively large in-
dustrial firms could mount a steady, successful research effort, 
given the level of investment in personnel and facilities required 
and the often long periods before any payoffs on investment were 
realized. These constraints especially affected basic as opposed to 
applied research, and the former assumed ever greater import-
ance over the years in both the chemical and electrical sectors 
(pp. 110-19). Demonstrating the second proposition, however, 
requires evidence that over the long run the largest firms have 
benefitted disproportionately from corporate industrial research; 
· though he claims that they have (pp. 120-21), Noble does not 
supply that evidence. In fact, the studies of the economist Edwin 
Mansfield and his students indicate that the relationship be-
tween firm size and successful innovation is not simple and lin-
ear. Their most pertinent data come from an analysis of the 
chemical industry since 1930 and suggest that the four largest 
chemical firms did not innovate relatively more in products and 
processes than their somewhat smaller competitors. The only ex-
ception was the disproportionate success in the area of products 
of the largest firm, DuPont. But size alone could not have been 
the determinant here, for the other three of the top four did not 
approximate DuPont's degree of success.8 
The rise of corporate industrial research, Noble says, had 
important human implications as well as economic ones, since 
the development of "research management" methods prevented 
truly free inquiry among employees in the industrial laboratories. 
Because true cooperation presupposes "individual autonomy and 
intention," and because the restraints researchers worked under 
negated these, Noble concludes that "their activities did not re-
flect a spirit of cooperative investigation so much as one of collec-
CAL OLIGOPOLY: COMPETITION OR COLLUSION 28 (1974). Backman adds that patent monop-
oly, while very important in some product lines like electric lamps, has played a minor 
role in other parts of the industry that are just as concentrated today. 
8. E. MANSFIELD, THE PRODUCTION AND APPLICATION OF NEW INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY 
66-67, 204-05 (1977). 
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tive subservience" (p. 120). His own evidence, however, suggests 
that this point has more formal than psychological validity for his 
discussion of professionalization emphasizes that, after 1900, en-
gineers generally saw their own career interests as bound up with 
corporate needs, and he provides :no proof that corporate require-
ments such as teamwork and hierarchical organization weighed 
more heavily on engineers in research departments than else-
where in the firm. For scientists involved in basic research, his 
analysis might be more apt, but Noble does not discuss the plight 
of the scientist in the corporation in any detail; thus the supposed 
disjunction between cooperation and "collective subservience" is 
never illustrated. 
A similar gap between institutional forms and the socio-
economic conclusions inferred from them also mars Noble's dis-
cussion of cooperation in research between industry and universi-
ties. As he demonstrates clearly, after 1900 corporate engineers 
and their allies worked hard to make research in the universities 
relevant to the needs of industry-to have the schools, as <;me of 
them put it, become "integrated as res~arch centers within the 
industrial structure" (p. 128). These efforts t<;>ok on many shapes: 
firms supported university fellowships in industrial research, re-
search institutes affiliated with schools undertook contract work, 
and university engineering departments themselves often did the 
same. At state universities the extension movement became more 
utilitarian, and engineering "experiment stations" were pro-
moted alongside agricultural ones.9 Finally, the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology introduced its influential Technology 
Plan in 1920, which guaranteed participating firms that for a 
standard fee they could gain access to MIT faculty for consulting 
services and to MIT's personnel files for recruitment purposes 
(pp. 123-43). 
Developments like these obviously brought the universities 
and the corporations closer together and mirrored a changing 
conception of the university's role in society-the spirit of the 
"multiversity" was already incarnate in programs like the Tech-
nology Plan. But Noble claims more-namely that such programs 
both (a) "shifted the burden of some significant costs, and risks, 
of modern industry from the private to the public sector" and (b) 
put a new set of constraints on the pursuit of knowledge, con-
9. Pluralists will take comfort from the inability of a formidable array of elite educa-
tors, executives, and scientific organizations to convince the United States Congress to 
support such stations (pp. 135-36). 
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straints which meant that "science had, indeed, been pressed into 
the service of capital" (p. 147). These conclusions are surely exag-
gerated. Regarding the first, Noble himself states that much of 
the "reorientation" and expansion of university facilities was 
being financed by industry or by philanthropic businessmen. 
This being so, he ought to show as well that they somehow earned 
a disproportionately high return on their investment, but this sort 
of data is nowhere presented. As far as the enslavement of science 
is concerned, most of Noble's examples of cooperation come from 
engineering research. Though engineers repeatedly stressed that 
basic science was becoming more and more important to indus-
try, a key figure like William Wickenden could also assert that 
they had to rely for basic research on "a vast army of free, disin-
terested and even impractical researchers" in the universities (p. 
128). Obviously such talk of freedom and impracticality has to be 
taken at less than full value; nevertheless, it shows that a diver-
gence in both methods and goals between pure and applied sci-
ence persisted and was recognized by elite engineers. Even the 
National Research Council, a group which Noble portrays as ded-
icated to "closing the gap" between science and industry, recog-
nized that divergence when in 1919 it decided that its programs 
to encourage basic research and industrial research would have 
to proceed independently of one another (p. 164). Also, the forces 
repelling science and industry have probably intensified in many 
fields since 1930, because an increasing proportion of basic re-
search has come to be federally funded and subject to a different 
set of priorities and constraints. 10 
Though Noble's case that science was reoriented is less than 
convincing, the "design" he discerns in the narrower field of tech-
nical education is visible to the reader. Corporate engineers, he 
shows, disliked the system of technical higher education preva-
lent at the turn of the century for two basic reasons. First, as 
outgrowths of the science curriculum, engineering courses, espe-
cially in chemical and electrical engineering, were heavily theo-
retical and insufficiently concerned with modern industrial prac-
tice. Second, the underfunded "shop work" that was supposed to 
compensate for these faults usually lagged far behind the state of 
the art in industry (p. 184). The largely successful attempts of 
engineers to overcome these problems ran along two principal 
10. For some figures on this shift, see N. ROSENBERG, TECHNOLOGY AND AMEIIICAN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 177-83 (1972). 
Jan.-Mar. 1979] Engineers in the Price System 699 
lines-in-house post-graduate training within industrial firms 
and cooperative-education programs in the engineering schools. 
Noble recounts the history of pioneering efforts in both these 
areas in detail, and what is more important, points out their 
uniformity in method and rationale. The most significant product 
of the in-house training idea was the corporation school; intro-
duced by General Electric in the 1890s, it had spread by 1920 to 
many other large corporations and, in industries made up of 
smaller firms, to trade associations as well. These schools tended 
to share four aims: to introduce the engineering graduate to the 
full range of "real-world" technical problems of modern industry; 
to instruct him in modern management methods; to socialize him 
to the mores of corporate employment; and finally, to determine 
his potential role in the firm by testing his strengths and weak-
nesses with the new techniques of "personnel management" (pp. 
170-79). 
Cooperative education, which combined alternating periods 
of classroom instruction and actual work in industry, began in 
1907 in the engineering department of the University of Cincin-
nati. Since cooperative education offered substantially the same 
benefits to industry as the corporation school at the same or 
smaller cost, it also became widespread by 1930. An interesting 
and important variant was introduced at MIT after World War 
I. As conceived by Magnus Alexander of General Electric for 
electrical and by the MIT-trained consultant Arthur D. Little for 
chemical engineering, the Institute co-op program was selective 
in admissions and offered graduate degrees. Like General Elec-
tric's in-house program, it emphasized management skills such as 
knowledge of economics and accounting. While the ordinary co-
op programs consciously aimed at producing "an engineer for 
commercial production," MIT's program represented "an impor-
tant new breeding-ground of America's corporate elite" (pp. 180-
95). A common rationale, however, lay behind both forms of coop-
erative education as well as behind the corporation schools-as 
an official of New York Edison said, all these endeavors resulted 
from the fact that "corporations ... no longer expect to find 
satisfactory help ready made, but are applying themselves to the 
task of making men as well as commodities." Noble adds in an 
ironic, though perhaps apt, aside that the real point had become 
"the production of men as commodities" (p. 179). 
Since engineers consciously saw education in terms of 
"processing human material," it was logical that they would seek 
standardized procedures for collecting supposedly "objective" 
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information about students and for evaluating that information. 
Thus, along with the corporation schools, engineering schools led 
the way in developing systematic student records-including not 
just grades, but scores on standardized tests, evaluations by pro-
fessors, and character profiles-records explicitly geared to the 
needs of actual and prospective employers. The complementarity 
of early corporate and college "personnel" systems is nowhere 
more clearly displayed than in the case of Purdue's engineering 
school: designed by Dean A.A. Potter, the Purdue procedures 
were not only adopted by other schools, but also became the 
nucleus for Westinghouse's corporate personnel system (pp. 188-
89). 
Having described the key features of the corporatization of 
technical higher education, Noble goes on to tell in great, perhaps 
excessive, detail the story of the national organizations that tried 
to impose the new corporate style on American higher education 
as a whole. The first great achievements of these groups came 
during World War I, when corporate engineers and like-minded 
educators held top administrative posts in the War Department 
programs which sought to provide technically trained manpower 
for the war effort. Through these programs and through the Na-
tional Research Council, a semi-official body whose aim was to 
mobilize the academic community, the engineers and their allies 
managed to introduce industrial personnel methods into the 
Army, to encourage wholesale use of aptitude and intelligence 
testing, and to impose military training on students in more than 
500 colleges (pp. 215, 207, 228, 218-21). 
After the wartime emergency, Noble tells us, these people 
returned to their primary task of coordinating education and in-
dustry; they worked through the successors of wartime agen-
cies-the "permanent" National Research Council and the 
American Council on Education, for example, as well as through 
new policy research groups like the National Industrial Confer-
ence Board. Among other functions, these groups acted as clear-
inghouses for educational reform along corporate lines. Aided by 
the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations, they also sponsored 
studies in "personnel research," intelligence and aptitude testing, 
and the like, work that engaged the talents of important psychol-
ogists like L.L. Thurstone and of well-known industrial psycholo-
gists like Elton Mayo (pp. 229-31, 254-55). 
Those who commissioned these projects quite explicitly 
stated that their ultimate objective was "to decide how education 
can be organized to meet industrial specifications" (p. 254). Nor 
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did they eschew manipulative means to their ends; rather, they 
hoped "to find the critical tests that control individual conduct 
and use these to secure voluntary cooperation and stimulate i:µdi-
vidual responsibility" {p. 229). They also sought to promote more 
blatantly ideological causes such as "countering in the school 
sinister industrial tendencies and fallacies" like socialism {p. 
229). Finally, Noble shows that these organizations were able to 
extend their influence, and thus the influence of "corporate re-
form," beyond the 1920s-the American Council on Education, 
for example, not only became the principal accreditation agency 
for American higher education, but its various programs in test-
ing were the direct precursors of the now ubiquitous Educational 
Testing Service {p. 255). 
As the foregoing illustrates, Noble develops a strong case for 
the idea that many familiar features of technical education, and 
of higher education generally, were originally promoted as a 
means of bringing the schools closer to meeting industrial 
"specifications," as defined by individuals with a corporate 
perspective. But on the crucial question of how great an impact 
these new programs and methods actually had in determining the 
nature of modern American higher education, he shows a procliv-
ity here as elsewhere for overstrong conclusions. These new initia-
tives, he declares, effectively ushered in the control of higher 
education by the "business principles" that Thorstein Veblen 
had satirized and lamented in The Higher Learning in America. 
That many academics did not and do not see this is to be ex-
pected, says Noble, for 
the corporate reformers never required that all who pursued higher 
learning in America be conscious of the utility of their work, nor 
even that such work be of ultimate utility. Rather, they created an 
institutional apparatus which would correlate the activities of aca-
demics "behind their backs," thereby rendering such conscious-
ness of purpose unnecessary. [P. 245] 
Anyone aware of the gulf that has often existed between 
"service-oriented" university administrators and "intellectuals" 
in faculties wants to sympathize with this assessment. Unfortu-
nately, only in the field of technical education does Noble clearly 
describe how the new systems qualitatively differed from the old. 
It is not just a want of imagination that prompts the reader to 
demand a glimpse of the "correlation" process at work in the 
other parts of the academy, for the general "reform" causes pro-
moted by Noble's elite seem to be primarily /ormal-record-
keeping, testing, accreditation, and the like. As such they would 
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be subject to various uses in practice, uses which cannot be pre-
dicted from the corporate engineers' purposes alone. Because of 
this difficulty, the reader finds no grounds on which to conclude 
that- "corporate reform" actually altered the modern American 
university's status quo, which Laurence Veysey defines as a state 
of permanent tension between a dominant, business- and service-
minded perspective and a less powerful, but still tenacious, view-
point that stressed free inquiry, social criticism, and other "ivory 
tower" objectives.11 Perhaps if Noble had chosen to write about 
the 1930s or 1960s, periods in which business and corporate values 
were vigorously attacked by intellectuals, he would have recog-
nized that this tension survived early twentieth century 
"corporate reform" and remained a source of worry for later gen-
erations of corporate spokesmen. 
Ill 
In the last section of America by Design, Noble moves away 
from the universities and back toward industry. His theme is the 
evolution of modern management and the corporate engineers' 
role in that evolution. Again the framework is explicitly Marxian. 
By the early twentieth century industrial corporations realized 
that designing complex machinery to break the autonomy of 
skilled workers could only extract part of the potential surplus 
value of alienated labor. Corporations had also to undertake "the 
deliberate engineering of the work place and the work activity of 
labor" (pp. 259-60). According to Noble, science-based industry 
was for three reasons especially subject to this new imperative. 
First, the positivist attitude of many engineers proved amenable 
to notions about rationalizing the human side of the industrial 
process. Second, engineer-managers in these industries had half 
won the battle, since they, not the workers, controlled most of the 
information on which production depended. Finally, greater 
productivity and stability in the labor force was critical to contin-
uous utilization of expensive plant facilities, a need that all 
highly concentrated industries felt (pp. 259-60). 
Noble presents an impressive list of engineer-executives who 
helped develop important tools of modern management-men 
like Gerard Swope at General Electric, Alfred P. Sloan at General 
Motors, and Hamilton Barksdale at DuPont (pp. 278-83). His 
main concern, however, is with a single aspect of the new science 
11. L. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 439-44 (1965). 
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of management-its handling of the "human problem," which 
actually meant the problem of molding a docile and efficient work 
force. In his view, efforts to solve the "human problem" ran along 
two lines. The first, social engineering, involved "the conscious 
attempt to exercise management prerogatives through the me-
dium of the workplace, through organization of the work activity 
of labor." The second, human engineering, "was the movement 
to control the human element of production . . . through the 
study and manipulation of human behavior" (p. 264). 
Social engineering, as Noble defines it, first emerged clearly 
in the work of Frederick W. Taylor and his followers in scientific 
management. He provides a brief, synthetic account of Taylor-
ism, based on the work of Samuel Haber and others; 12 that ac-
count's main purpose is to show how a "revisionist" conception 
of scientific management had developed early in this century, a 
conception that increasingly stressed problems like motivating 
workers and retreated from the absolute rule of the stopwatch 
(pp. 266-77). The new outlook in scientific management turned 
out to be quite close to attitudes that were developing simultane-
ously among "corporate liberal" managers, since the latter espe-
cially desired to systematize and modernize the "welfare" pro-
grams that many firms had been supporting since the 1890s, as 
well as to introduce more "scientific" procedures for handling 
employees as individuals and in groups (pp. 286-95). The two 
streams of management innovation, Noble argues, tended to coa-
lesce between 1910 and 1930, to agree more and more that 
"human engineering" was the sine qua non of effective manage-
ment. 
The range of projects that Noble treats under the rubric of 
"human engineering" is broad-it includes "industrial relations" 
research, the establishment of personnel departments, vocational 
education and guidance in public schools, industrial psychology, 
and the study of management in engineering schools. Except for 
the last of these projects, his analysis deals mainly with the insti-
tutional role corporate engineers played in promoting and run-
ning them; it adds little to our knowledge of their content. As 
with the reform of university education, the discussion does not 
illuminate the vital problem of where projects succeeded or failed 
in achieving corporate purposes. 
12. See, e.g., H. AITKEN, TAYLORISM AT WATERTOWN ARsENAL (1960); S. HABER, Em-
CIENCY AND UPLIIT (1964); M. NADWORNY, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND THE UNIONS, 1900-
1932 (1955). 
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In his portrayal of modern management Noble does, how-
ever, provide valuable insights into why certain activities ap-
pealed to managers with an engineering background. One fine 
example is his explanation for the vogue of early industrial psy-
chology, which tended to emphasize both "hidden laws" of be-
havior and the nonrational sources of conduct. The first notion 
attracted the engineer, Noble explains, because it promised a 
degree of control over people comparable to that exerted over 
inanimate objects, while the second allowed the engineer as man-
ager to by-pass the troublesome phenomena of rational purpose 
and conscious values in his workers {pp. 297-98). The discussion 
as a whole would have been much stronger if this sort of clarity 
about the motivations behind projects like industrial psychology 
had extended to the accomplishments of these projects, or the 
lack thereof. 
IV 
In exploring the genesis of modern management, Noble pays 
more attention than in earlier parts of the book to groups who 
opposed the plans of the corporate elite-mainly to the workers 
who resisted scientific management and rejected corporate 
"welfare" work, but also to other groups like the progressive edu-
cators who attacked vocational tracking systems for school chil-
dren. With this shift in emphasis he seems to be setting the stage 
for the qualified conclusions of his epilogue, conclusions which go 
against the tone of much of the discussion in previous chapters. 
For, in the epilogue, he tells us that the "designs" he has labored 
to uncover have never been completely translated into reality, 
because the structure that corporate engineers hoped to 
strengthen was flawed from the beginning: it did not serve society 
as a whole, but only "served the dominant class in society, that 
class which, in order to survive, must forever struggle to extract 
labor from, and thus control the lives of, the class beneath it." 
No matter how much engineers might mislabel or disparage their 
opponents, rational opposition to domination by corporate capi-
tal was bound to .exist, and thus opposition to the engineers' 
"designs" was inevitable as well. And, Noble admonishes us, "no 
myth of classlessness, no 'end of ideology' ideology, however com-
forting, however innocent, can ever obscure" these facts {pp. 323-
24). 
Of course, the rhetoric is perfervid, but neither that fact nor 
the invocation of the theory of surplus value is the key historical 
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problem here. Rather, the problem is that Noble has introduced 
some historical complexities that neither the tone nor the content 
of his text have truly prepared us for; his failure to face these 
complexities throughout has severely limited the persuasiveness 
of his tale. All along we have been seeing with the eyes of the elite; 
now that we hear about the existence of conflict we want to know 
more about what the elite has been neglecting to tell us. Simply 
invoking that conflict does not adequately reveal the interplay 
between elite designs and events. But beyond this, Noble's con-
cluding diagnosis of the reasons for conflict over corporate designs 
oversimplifies recent American history; it underestimates the 
true range of social forces and social perspectives that have done 
battle over issues like the role of the university in society and the 
aims and priorities of scientific research. Noble's Marxian view-
point has sensitized him to the implications of clashes between 
corporate managers and the working class; but divisions within 
the middle-class that might undercut the hegemony of corporate 
values he has largely ignored. Thus, the various middle-class 
groups with vital interests wrapped up in the institutions that 
were the objects of corporate "engineering plans"-i.e., the indi-
vidual inventors, research scientists, university faculty and stu-
dents, progressive reformers, and politicians-never receive their 
due as actors in the American socioeconomic and political struc-
ture. Their actions, just as much as those of the engineers, must 
be accounted for in explaining the shape of modern institutions. 
When he debunks the myth of "the end of ideology" Noble 
means not only that class conflict continues to exist, but also that 
his twentieth-century corporate engineers have acted consistently 
in ideological ways. Since he does indeed seem to have estab-
lished the latter proposition, he has achieved much of the purpose 
of America by Design. On the other hand, he clearly has fallen 
short of showing that the resultant of those actions and counter-
vailing forces has shifted science, technology, and education 
themselves to an ideological role in American society. And it is 
on this latter question that the real degree of subservience of 
science and technology to corporate capital turns. Noble has 
failed in this larger task mainly because all along he has insuffi-
ciently addressed the problem of pluralism in the modern Ameri-
can social order. Even when, in the political sphere, "pluralism" 
stands discredited as a byword denoting an inability to confront 
the reality of corporate power and the existence of elites, it re-
mains a valid historical and sociological concept-valid, that is, 
when it refers to the fact that social groups can arrange them-
706 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:685 
selves along other axes of conflict or cooperation besides owner-
ship of the means of production. Institutions involved in the pro-
motion and practice of science and technology have not been 
immune to influence from these other kinds of intergroup divi-
sion. It may be that the corporate elite's influence has been the 
determining one since 1900, and the influence of labor its only 
significant opposition, but examining elite organizations and atti-
tudes cannot in itself establish this. Noble has thus been unable 
to transform a solid piece on the history of a professional elite into 
a compelling piece of social history. 
